Support[ edit ] Would prevent many U.
Often attached to such analysis is the notion that insofar as the atomic bombs ended the war prior to an invasion and saved hundreds of thousands or millions of lives, the use of the atomic bombs was also a morally sound decision.
There tends to be a remarkable level of homogeneity amongst the traditionalist arguments.
Whereas they may emphasize certain facts or aspects of the debate, they tend to present strikingly similar arguments, with a few exceptions. The revisionists, in contrast, tend to be far more heterogeneous. Revisionist historians are unconvinced by the official narrative, and tend to emphasize the alternatives to the atomic bomb not pursued by the Truman administration.
Furthermore, most revisionists accept, on some level, the "atomic diplomacy" thesis articulated first by Gar Alperovitz in The third camp, the consensus historians, are those who J. Samuel Walker refers to as having "reached a broad, though hardly unanimous, consensus on some key issues surrounding the use of the bomb.
What distinguishes them from the traditionalists is the argument that the atomic bombs were not a military necessity. On the other hand, their rejection or hesitancy to incorporate atomic diplomacy into their analysis differentiates them from the revisionists.
Given the nature of the three camps, the organizational framework I have utilized includes three sections. The first section will deal with the debate between traditionalists and revisionists.
It will focus on questions of atomic diplomacy, the Potsdam Conference, unconditional surrender, Soviet entry into the war, projected casualty figures, and certain key figures in the Truman administration, the Soviet Union, and Japan. The second section will examine the points of disagreement within the revisionist camp.
Although revisionists all challenge the orthodox position, they are significantly less homogenous than the latter. The third section of the essay will explore the consensus historians and their disagreements with both the traditionalists and the revisionists.
Given the level of unanimity amongst the traditionalist historians, it is unnecessary to dedicate a section exploring differences between them because with rare exceptions, which will be noted when appropriate, there is remarkably little disagreement.
The essay will conclude with a brief analysis of the authors, such as Robert Newman and Paul Boyer, who have extended their chronological framework significantly beyond the actual use of the atomic bombs. The Hiroshima Decision Robert P. Invasion or the Bomband Wilson D. Miscamble's The Most Controversial Decision: Truman, the Atomic Bombs, and the Defeat of Japan Sherwin's A World Destroyed: Stalin, Truman, and the Surrender of Japan The positions of the traditionalists and the revisionists regarding atomic diplomacy, the Potsdam Conference, Japanese surrender, the unconditional surrender policy, Soviet entry into the war, projected casualty figures, and key individuals  involved in the decision to use the bomb and Japanese surrender are fundamentally at odds.
The question of atomic diplomacy is what creates the fundamental divide between the two camps. Although there is great variation between revisionist and traditionalist positions on unconditional surrender, the role and race and racism, and other factors, most questions tend to be subsumed within and intricately bound up with atomic diplomacy.
Since the revisionists first posited this thesis, it is appropriate to adumbrate their arguments. Objecting to the official narrative that "Truman simply had no choice except to use the atomic bomb," Alperovitz argues that Truman, significantly influenced by Byrnes, used the bomb as a form of "atomic diplomacy" to pursue post-war U.
In essence, Alperovitz argues that the U. It was during this time that "a conscious decision not to encourage Soviet participation in the war" was undertaken.
Attempts "to delay the Red Army's attack to the extent feasible" were meant to "limit Soviet political influence in Asia.
Martin Sherwin supplements Alperovitz's atomic diplomacy thesis by extending the importance of such diplomatic concerns backwards into the Roosevelt administration.
Sherwin posits that the policies of the Roosevelt administration suggest "that the diplomatic value of the bomb began to shape his atomic energy policies as early as He notes the "incredible pressure" on Manhattan project scientists to complete the bombs prior to the Potsdam conference.
Similarly, he explains how Truman purposefully postponed the conference to coincide with the bomb tests. Takaki maintains that two "schools of thought" dominated the thinking of U. Hasegawa's argument aligns with Alperovitz's as well." A dirty an analysis of the reason for dropping the atomic bomb bomb or radiological dispersal device (RDD) is a speculative radiological weapon that combines radioactive material with conventional explosives.
In this interview, Peter Kuznick discusses the United States' war crimes -- from the atomic an analysis of the reason for dropping the atomic bomb bombings of Japan, to the cheap. Read the press release from President Truman on August 6, following the dropping of the atomic bomb noting important details about its production and the rhetoric used.
Document Analysis Distribute copies of the document to each student to read. This student essay consists of approximately 2 pages of analysis of Reasons to Support and Not Support the Dropping of the Atomic Bomb.
Summary: Despite the justifications provided by people, who support the dropping of the atomic bomb, there are an equal number of reasons why other people believe.
The Benefits of Dropping an Atomic Bomb on Japan - Angelina Jolie said, “Without pain, there would be no suffering, without suffering we would never learn from our mistakes.
Dropping The Atomic Bombs and its army was completely isolated in Manchuria, others saw no compelling military reason to drop the bomb. Land-based bombers moreover leveled. Aug 06, · His public reason for using the atomic bomb, given in , was to avoid an invasion of Japan and thus to save the lives of up to five hundred thousand Americans.